Subtle Despotism

But it would seem that if despotism were to be established amongst the democratic nations of our days, it might assume a different character; it would be more extensive and more mild; it would degrade men without tormenting them…

-Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America

For Tocqueville, the freedom that American citizens were experiencing in their democracy in the 1830s was not quite as simple as it appeared from afar and he noticed, upon closer inspection, that citizens were not altogether free from subordination. Tocqueville thought this form of servitude unique because it kept citizens bound to the people collectively as opposed to one imposing ruler holding an unchecked and unbalanced amount of power (II, 265). And although it was a relief for him to see such substantial limits placed on central authority, it was less obvious to Tocqueville as to where the majority’s power ended, if indeed there were any limits at all. Unlimited power was of particular concern for Tocqueville because it did not protect citizens from facing suppression in the “smaller and more private” affairs, which he felt, were essential matters in which to exercise freedom (II, 265). In Democracy in America, Tocqueville reflects extensively on this flaw and suggests that tyranny of the majority can largely be blamed for such conditions. And although Tocqueville is dazzled by the religious spirit in the United States and feels that religion is a vital component of democratic republics, because religion itself facilitates the use of free institutions in America, “free institutions” must protect nonreligious freedom and nonreligious tolerance to safeguard against tyranny of the majority as it is understood by Tocqueville in this discourse.

One characteristic that Tocqueville found striking about America was the social equality he observed among citizens, including governing officials, whom he perceived more as “guardians” than rulers (II, 264). He was interested to learn that their power was restricted by three branches of government at both the federal and state level in addition to a fixed set of principles recognized by federal and state constitutions. And although these seemed like responsible precautions to Tocqueville, he was not convinced of their ability to secure the freedom of all Americans and points to one loophole specifically that he felt posed a threat to the liberty promised to them under constitutional law. “When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly obeys its injunctions; if to executive power, it is appointed by the majority, and remains a passive tool in its hands…” (I,167). This inquiry was provocative because it criticized a system of government that was designed specifically to combat tyranny of the majority and its associated evils. Indeed, in Federalist Paper no. 51, Publius* acknowledges tyranny of the majority as a future threat to the founder’s proposed form of government and takes special care in explaining the measures being taken to protect against this pitfall and its effects, stating:

Whilst all authority in [the federal republic] will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. (Madison et al.)

In this passage, Publius attempts to persuade his readers that religion is best protected from tyranny the more sects it has and that civil rights are best protected from tyranny the more divisions of government there are and the more interests it exists within. However, by using the term “free government”, Publius is applying rhetoric in a way that causes readers to believe that the proposed government is “free” from government insofar as no laws can be made regarding religion (which is true), but also, that the government is “free” from religion, which is impossible due to the spiritual/metaphysical nature of religion. Moreover, by saying that “in a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights”, Publius creates an illusion that politics and religion are two entirely separate entities and that civil rights will be protected by a fully secular government. This argument is also fallacious because it presupposes that religious principles are not embedded into the foundation of each division of government or in the minds of citizens yet to hold authoritative positions within the government, which would automatically be a conflict of interest according to Publius’s theory that does not explain how such a conflict could be resolved. Furthermore, in many states, religious institutions were established prior to the first amendment, which not only means that religion itself was the first institution in America, but that the democratic republic was founded by individuals who may have possibly acquired a Christian worldview before designing the constitution and the birth of American democracy, hence, a Christian worldview may be necessary to share in the feeling of political unity that Tocqueville finds so appealing.  

Tocqueville was cautious of tyranny of the majority because it consisted in numbers, which meant that it had a dispersive effect on the nation at large yet could not easily be detected through sense perception. But the most worrisome quality about it in his view, was its limitlessness. In his chapter on “Tyranny of the Majority”, Tocqueville states that “unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing” and believes that humans simply cannot be trusted to exercise it with delicacy (I,167). And although such mistreatment of power had not yet been actualized in an obvious sort of way from his observations, he remains steadfast in his claim that “no sure barrier is established against [tyrannical abuses], and that the causes which mitigate the government are to be found in the circumstances and the manners of the country more than its laws” (I,168). What Tocqueville is implying here, is that the majority in America is the government insofar as it indirectly decides its own laws, therefore, any injustices taking place on a “smaller and more private” level, would first require the support of the majority to be reconciled or even taken seriously. Tocqueville states:

In the United States the unbounded power of the majority, which is favourable to the legal despotism of the legislature, is likewise favourable to the arbitrary authority of the magistrate. The majority has entire control over the law when it is made and when it is executed; and as it possesses an equal authority over those who are in power and the community at large, it considers public officers as passive agents, and readily confides the task of serving its designs to their vigilance… (Tocqueville I,168)

This passage reflects the level of power that the majority’s opinion holds over American governing officials who may seem like they are free from influence, but in truth, are enabled and indeed “backed” by the majority that sometimes even allows these officials to exceed the bounds of their determined reach (I,168). 

Tocqueville also noticed a level of individualism that his own country was not experiencing, informing his readers that “individualism” is “of democratic origin, and it threatens to spread in the same ratio as the equality of conditions” (II,83). He says that America has applied “free institutions” to help safeguard against this social dissolution, which, Tocqueville says, causes citizens to remove themselves from the rest of society once they have acquired all the knowledge and skills necessary to lead an independent life. He explains how American citizens have “combat[ed]” this effect by “infus[ing] political life into each portion of the territory, in order to multiply to an infinite extent opportunities of acting in concert for all the members of the community, and to make them constantly feel their mutual dependence on each other” (II,88). The “infusion” to which Tocqueville is referring here, is America’s local government system that is typically comprised of both counties and municipal institutions within each state and is beneficial to democracies for two main reasons. First, because local affairs are being conducted by citizens who reside within the district (II,88), and these citizens are therefore personally invested in the long-term goals of the community. And second, it means that more citizens within each state can hold administrative positions within these institutions, and thus, be actively involved in the politics concerning their own communities. Tocqueville finds this system advantageous because it allows for a greater number of citizens to be responsible for the well-being of the community, who may in turn, feel how their political participation affects their town and its inhabitants. He argues that this sort of direct engagement encourages more citizens to work together towards common political goals (II,88).

What Tocqueville does not point out, however, is how this distribution of authority can also incite tyranny of the majority if these authoritative positions are held by citizens who all share the same religion because they were elected to these positions by members of the community who share that faith, which begs the question: Where does this leave the minority of non-believers in America? How is their freedom being protected? Not only can such conditions potentially affect their ability to attain positions of authority within all levels of government, but it also puts them at risk of facing limitless subjugation by the majority who do believe. Likewise, if the majority were secular, the minority of believers would be at risk of facing limitless subjection by the majority who are non-believers. Given this blatant flaw, it was unsurprising then, that the spiritual unity Tocqueville encountered in America was unparalleled to anything he had ever experienced before exclaiming at the time, “there is no country in the whole world in which the Christian religion exercises but little influence upon the laws and upon the details of public opinion, but it directs the manners of the community, and by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state” (I,197). But just how “little” is this influence? Interestingly, one academic has pointed out that, according to Tocqueville, the Irish Catholics who arrived in America after fleeing Ireland during the Potato Famine “are among the greatest supporters of democracy when they come to America and [they don’t] try to intrude on the political realm” (Livingstone). Indeed, “there is no impulse at all in the United States towards theocracy, there is no impulse where the religious institutions are trying to get access to power and rule the United States like a theocracy” (Livingstone). So, what is it about democracy exactly that appeals to these Christian sects and what inspires them to vehemently support the separation of church and state? Is it possible that Christians of all sects have confidence in the fact that their collective influence can guide the laws and “details of public opinion” in democracies?

Unfortunately, Tocqueville says that whatever influence religion may have, is not all that easy for outsiders to detect since the church and state have no formal ties with each other and members of the American clergy do not outwardly support any political systems (I,199). By all outward appearances the two appear to be wholly separate entities. Yet despite this separation, these two bodies seemed to share a bond that simply could not be broken according to Tocqueville, who observed that “if a political character attacks a sect, this may not prevent even the partisans of that very sect from supporting him; but if he attacks all the sects together, everyone abandons him and he remains alone” (199). This suggests that the political leaders must belong (or at least profess their loyalty) to the prevailing religion, (which, in America’s case, is Christianity) if they are to win the support of the majority and that it is the sharing of faith, more generally, that fosters trust between citizens and their politicians. Not only does this mean that government and religion are not, in fact, separate entities, but also, that the “free institutions” from which American democracy was founded, do not adequately protect the secular community and a citizen’s right not to have religious affiliation.

Because of this flaw, “free institutions” in America must protect nonreligious freedom in addition to religious freedom as well as nonreligious tolerance in addition to religious tolerance so that the minority of non-believers in America currently, are protected against segregation and/or unjust treatment by the majority who may feel a sense of political unity through their faith. In addition, objective moral values must be grounded in natural law to further protect against tyranny of the majority, but more specifically, the freedom of citizens who are involuntarily excluded from (or who do not identify with) the prevailing religion and its moral principles.

Sincerely,

Heather

*Publius was the pen name used by the authors of the The Federalist Papers

Note: This post was inspired by a scholarly lecture on Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America given by Dr. David Livingstone and a seminar discussion on this text with my brilliant LBST370 classmates facilitated by Dr. Warren Heiti. It should be noted however, that my views are not necessarily shared by all the professors or students in this Liberal Studies class.

Works Consulted

de Tocqueville, Alexis. “Democracy in America.” Course pack for Liberal Studies 370: Revolutions of the Modern World, compiled by Dr. Warren Heiti, Spring 2024, Vancouver Island University.

Livingstone, David. Lecture on Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America.” LBST370, 23 January

2024, Vancouver Island University, Nanaimo.

Madison, James. “The Federalist No. 51, [6 February 1788],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0199. [Original source: The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 4, January 1787 – May 1788, ed. Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962, pp. 497–502.]