Grounding Objective Moral Values in Natural Law

Whatsoever that be within us that feels, thinks, desires, and animates, is something celestial, [transcendant], and consequently, imperishable.

-Aristotle

In his essay on “The Subjectivity of Values”, philosopher, J. L. Mackie outlines two main kinds of arguments that have been popular in defending the claim that “there are no objective values” (179): The argument from relativity and the argument from queerness. Mackie is suspicious of the motives that underlay the “objectification” of moral values and believes that the justification of most objectivity claims is resting on mere attitudes (185). He argues that since a well-functioning society relies, at least in part, on the authority of moral judgements, it is in most people’s best interest to take the objectivist position on moral values, which, in Mackie’s view, is a false one (185). However, by failing to acknowledge the objective order in nature, Mackie’s, so called, ‘error theory’ works against the very direction our (human) nature inclines, and thus, cannot function within any theory directed toward a final purpose. In this post I will argue why Mackie’s failure to address the core tenets of natural law disrupts the validity of his argument from relativity and how objective moral values can be legitimized within the framework of Aristotle’s classical and moral theory.

Ironically, the argument from relativity emanates from the principle of acceptance. Principally, we want to be accepting of other societies’ customs and norms because it is in our nature to establish and maintain fellowship. When we accept the differences of others and others accept ours, we are giving each other space to grow and flourish, indirectly helping one another fulfill our very purpose as humans. Discouragingly, this principle, which, at first, seems so innocent, invariably degenerates into ideology that cannot support the existence of objective moral values. The reason for this is that since the idea of ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’ is inconsistent across cultures, it means that there is a variation of moral standards, and consequently, no moral truths. In his article “On the Subjectivity of Values”, Mackie argues that moral disagreement alone, is evidence that there are no objective values and that ‘moral sense’, or ‘intuition’ is a more cogent explanation of what forms our basic moral judgements than ‘reason’, stating:

People judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or wrong, not because they exemplify some general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvable different responses in others. (Mackie 180)

In Mackie’s view, if there is disagreement about what the good is, then the argument from relativity is, at least to some degree, a valid one. However, many critics are unconvinced by this argument and believe that our notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ cannot merely be “subjective preferences” as Mackie suggests. In one critique of Mackie’s theory, scholar, Louis Pojman points out that cross-cultural disagreement about morals does not invalidate objective morality because this disagreement could easily be due to “ignorance, immaturity, moral insensitivity, superstition, or irrational authority” (511). Pojman says that although moral principles cannot be tested using empirical methods, cultures that fail to incorporate the most common values such as truth telling and prohibiting murder “are not likely to prosper or even survive” (513), which means moral values can (and have already) been “tested” in a sense. Moreover, as Robert Gascoigne notes in his article “God and Objective Moral Values”, the relativist can deny the existence of universal mores while hypocritically insisting that some acts must not be done to him (534). In other words, if the relativist feels the need to protect himself against, what he believes to be, ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ acts, or can sense when a moral violation has occurred, it means that we (humans) have ingrained in us, a protective mechanism against anything we believe will cause us harm (or compromise our self-preservation), and it is this response which proves that objective moral values exist. 

Aristotle believed that humans and other animals are equipped with such defence mechanisms, in part, because they exist ‘by nature’ and that all things that exist ‘by nature’ have, within themselves, “a principle of motion and of stationariness” (236). Since we have a natural inclination for self-preservation, we are naturally inclined to act ‘according to [our] nature’ so that we may better fulfill this propensity (Arnhart 42). Aristotle’s Theory of Causation helps us to understand these “movements and changes” because it attends to both the physical and metaphysical components of our nature, including our final cause which helps us to understand why we exist which, in turn, connects us to our “end”/purpose. Since our capacity to develop reason and reasoned speech is what makes our species distinct from other animals, our final cause (purpose) is to achieve these things, and in doing so, reach our maximum potential, or in Aristotelian terms, “a good life”. Since a certain amount of human flourishing is required for this change to occur, it means that is in our best interest to flourish. Such truths are important because they connect us to a realm of values that cannot be disputed because they exist ‘by nature’. Meaning, they are protected under law that is wholly unconnected from conventional laws and standards, thus, cannot be invalidated by any argument much less the argument from relativity. Many philosophers have referred to this order as ‘natural law’ which protects our human nature at the most basic, (e.g., self-preservation), as well as the most fundamental, (e.g., human flourishing) level. This natural law theory disrupts the validity of Mackie’s argument because it proves that objective moral values do indeed exist, if only in relation to our natural rights. Furthermore, it allows us to make universal statements that are, to a degree, objectively true, for example, “good is that which supports human flourishing and bad is that which does not support human flourishing” or “it is wrong to impose rules that are incongruous with the human instinct for self-preservation, and it is right to contemplate the human instinct for self-preservation when designing law”. And although there can still be many disagreements surrounding the wording and application of these moral values, the principles it seeks to protect, cannot be argued in and of themselves. What I find most compelling about this Aristotelian-inspired theory is that, unlike Aquinas’ Natural Law Theory, it functions independently from God (or other sources of divinity), and can, therefore, be accessed by believers and non-believers alike. Religion is not (and cannot be) a divisive entity within it, yet it allows citizens to transcend the human experience and interact with their environments on a metaphysical and/or spiritual level.

There are, however, some obstacles that can inadvertently undermine this higher realm of truths. In his article titled “Value Comparability in Natural Law Ethics: A Defence”, author, Matthew Shae implies that we should be especially cautious of “New Natural Law theorists” who hold that there is no hierarchy or ranking of basic goods, therefore, cannot make any legitimate comparative claims about them (4). Although Shae agrees with many of these theorists that basic goods cannot be measured “in terms of a single scale of units of value” (4), he argues that “comparability* does not require commensurability*” (5) and understands that we can make sound comparative judgements “that do not depend on a universal and fixed hierarchy of goods but instead are particular and context-sensitive” (6). This argument is important because without this specification it is possible for an argument from relativity to reside within natural law theory, and thus, obscure objective moral values in a collective sense.

Furthermore, just because we accept one aspect of Aristotle’s classical theory, it does not mean that it is in our collective interest to bring all his ideas and ethics forth to the present. Like most theory, it has its limitations. For example, grounding objective moral values in natural law cannot stop political leaders from practicing tyrannical methods of leadership or stop influencers from corrupting their followers. It cannot prevent people from adhering to harmful ideology or stop cultures from carrying out practices such as female genital mutation or “honor killing”. All it does, is acknowledge natural rights and ground objective moral values in natural law. It gives a strong basis from which we can form a reasonably just (and somewhat timeless) set of principles that can safely guide our actions while instilling in us a sense of moral integrity. It can be a legitimate foundation from which nations can design and/or modify their constitutions or from which parents can establish a simple set of house rules. Law makers can use it to inform their policy so as not to infringe upon our natural rights and it can protect our society from adopting nihilistic ideology that leads to purposelessness.

So, while Mackie is correct that objective good is more likely to be sought by those who are “acquainted with it” (183), his argument does not (and cannot) abolish the existence of objective moral values themselves. Under natural law, we have the right to knowledge of the ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’ because it directly affects the extent to which we can exercise our inherent rights to autonomy (including thought and speech), property, and self-preservation since our human-made “positive” law (and our adherence to this law) has the power to interfere with our access to these rights. If applied in the ‘right’ way, Aristotle’s moral and classical theory not only confirms the existence of objective moral values, but also, grounds them in law that is both permanent and universal. Accepting the argument from relativity is highly impractical because to do so, would be to put our wants before our needs — we need value theory that supports human flourishing. We need teleological principles that speak to both believers and non-believers. We need transcendence. We need purpose. We need to be able to move in the direction to which our nature inclines and we need all people in authoritative positions to know why we need these things. Our survival depends upon it.

Sincerely,

Heather

*Comparability is the quality or state of being comparable  

*Commensurability is the quality or state of being measurable 

Note: This post was inspired by the ethical education of author, philosopher, and self-professed "provocateur" - Professor Clemotte, my brilliant PHIL112 classmates, and the truths, insights, (and sometimes provocation) of the philosophers, essayists, and thinkers (both past and present) that we studied this semester.

Works Cited

Aristotle. “Physics.” Course pack for Liberal Studies 325: Our Place in the Cosmos, compiled by David Livingstone, Spring 2022, Vancouver Island University.  

Arnhart, Larry. Political Questions: Political Philosophy from Plato to Rawls. Waveland Press, 2003.

Gascoigne, Robert. “God and Objective Moral Values.” Religious Studies, vol. 21, no. 4, 1985, pp. 531-549

Mackie, J.L. “The Subjectivity of Values.” The Ethical Life: Fundamental Readings in Ethics and Moral Problems. Oxford University Press, 2021, pp. 178-186.

Pojman, Louis P. “A Critique of Mackie’s Theory of Moral Subjectivism.” Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 3rd Ed. Wadsworth, 1999.

Shea, Matthew. “Value Comparability in Natural Law Ethics: A Defence.” The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2022, pp. 1-20