People will forget what you said, people will forget what you did, but people will never forget how you made them feel.
-Maya Angelou
At first glance, Kant’s moral command that we treat humanity as an end rather than a mere means seems like an upright code to follow, and arguably could be, provided there were no conditions attached. However, Kant’s “principle of humanity” is not unconditional because it contains subtle criterion that render it exclusive rather than universal. Not only does this exclusivity put the honourability of the principle into question, it prompts us to conduct a thorough examination of Kant’s “formula of the law of nature” to assess whether it is in accordance with natural law. Although his second formulation of the categorical imperative has the potential to be an admirable and even objective moral law, Kant’s foundational beliefs unfortunately destroy the tenability of his principle of humanity as well as the dignity of those who fall short of its specifications.
In the second section of Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMM), philosopher, Immanuel Kant commands that we “So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case at the same time as an end, never as a means only” (88; sec. 2), which, if taken at face value, is indeed a noble moral law that could inspire meaningful interactions among the human race. However, to accurately comprehend this formulation of his categorical imperative, we must have a firm grasp of his understanding of the term humanity. When Kant uses the term “humanity”, he is referring to our nature as rational animals, which not only presupposes reason, but also categorically separates humanity from other living things. By accepting Kant’s principle of humanity, we are accepting his belief that humans are inherently dignified because they are rational in nature — we must believe that humans are deserving of a higher respect than other life forms. Distressingly, we may even have to believe that it is rational humans, specifically, who deserve this higher respect. While this may seem like a practical belief from certain vantage points, it is our moral responsibility to examine how nonrational beings are being protected under Kantian law, if at all.
The first shortcoming that I will discuss is found within Kant’s belief that “non-rational
beings [have] only a relative value as means” (87; sec. 2), which implies that any being who
lacks rationality has merely conditional worth. In Kant’s opinion, anything that is void of
rationality is more object or “thing” than it is human, therefore, should be treated as such. The main feature that distinguishes things from persons, according to Kant, is the capacity to choose, which he argues is only present in rational beings whose desires do not drive their actions (87; sec. 2). This belief stems from Kant’s foundational principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (87; sec.2) which gives objective value to rational beings only because their reasonable nature regulates their will and makes clear that such a quality is deserving of a higher honour. He says that such beings may best be referred to as
“persons”, “whose existence is an end in itself" (87; sec. 2) which, for Kant, means to have unconditional worth. Moreover, it is specified that it is this rationality specifically that deems these beings worthy of respect which automatically lessens the respectability of all those who do not fulfill this qualification. And though Kant’s theory does not explicitly state that nonrational beings are of unworthy of respect, his distinction between things and persons inadvertently puts the dignity of nonrational “things” at risk and does not give them equal protection from being used merely as a means by those who adhere to
this imperative.
Also putting the validity of Kant’s second formulation into question is his foundational
belief that goodness is contingent upon reason. In the first section of GMM, Kant states that
“…reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, that is, as one which is to have influence on the will, …, its true vocation must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary” (57). This quote suggests that a good will presupposes reason, thus, cannot be attained by those without it. He argues that it is a “good will” alone that is responsible for “correct[ing]” the influence of the vices and indeed “rectify the principle of acting…” (55; sec. 1), and since nonrational beings do not have the reason which Kant believes generates a good will, such beings cannot have access to either the morality or moral law that fosters virtuous actions. As a result, those who are already at a disadvantage (because they do not have access to morals) are at even greater risk of exploitation because Kant’s theory, irresponsibly, enables this maltreatment. Moreover, there are no degrees of reason suggested within Kantian moral theory, one either has reason or one does not which is inconsistent with our slow, evolutionary cycle as human organisms. Since nonrational beings are not in possession of a free will, it means that these “things” are necessarily non-moral, but is this a just proposition? Is rationality a fair standard by which we can base moral imperatives? Do we
have a moral obligation to treat nonrational human beings with respect?
Curiously, for Kant, treating everyone as an end in themselves, is the same as willing a
universal law and says that these formulations are equivalent because they both adhere to reason, and are, therefore, conducive to willing (74; sec.2). These characteristics make these principles “objectively necessary” in his view, which means that all beings with reason have a moral duty to obey these commands. Nonrational beings, by contrast, do not share this obligation because they possess neither the reason nor the will to do so which, one could argue, unfairly affects their ability to be moral agents. Because our moral worth is dependent on our ability to reason within Kantian theory, the dignity and respect of those without this ability (or who have not fully developed this ability) are at risk of being treated as less than human by those who abide by these standards. By making reason the basis of morality, Kant is not elevating all humans, but rather, only those with the ability to reason.
While Kant’s notion of dignity may not necessarily be a problematic feature in and of
itself, when paired against utilitarian ethics (which considers dignity an exchangeable good), it can cause irreconcilable tension between parties who hold tight to these opposing positions according to some scholars. In “The Limit of Reason (or Why Dignity Is Not Negotiable)”, Professor, Sari Nusseibeh speaks highly of the Kantian conception of dignity, which in his view, is inalienable. He presumes that since dignity is considered priceless within the Kantian moral framework, it “cannot be negotiated”, which he says can have significant implications within a political context (Nusseibeh 5). Nusseibeh argues that all forms of dehumanization are unlawful when the preservation of human dignity is nonnegotiable, however, all parties must share this view if peace is the ultimate goal (7). Furthermore, he says that when dignity cannot be relinquished, it becomes justifiable to preserve it at all costs “even at the expense…of physical life” (6) which can result in harmful action (or nonaction) by those who hold tightly to this conception of dignity. Because of this risk, we must be certain about what exactly qualifies as an autonomous will since it justifies dignity within Kantian ethics. If the standard of autonomy is too low, it becomes justifiable for pre-rational humans to engage in actions that preserve the dignity of which, they, themselves, do not yet have a fully developed conception of.
Now suppose that Kant’s foundational principle was simply modified to nature exists as
an end in itself as opposed to his more exclusory version, rational nature exists as an end in
itself. By doing so, his imperative to treat humanity as an end rather than a means is no longer conditional upon rationality, thus, protecting the dignity of humanity in a more inclusive sense as well as other living organisms. Furthermore, if we follow his imperative in a more all-embracing manner and So act as to treat everything, in every case at the same time as an end, never as a means only, we can apply this principle to more general experiences in addition to our interactions with humanity. For example, a university level philosophy course would become a gift to be treasured for its own sake rather than simply a means to credit or a degree. If practically applied, such an imperative has the potential to inspire true presence in the education itself as opposed to mere presence in the classroom, and while it would be difficult to explain why it is our moral duty to treat everything as an end, the modified principle does inspire a wider range of nourishing experiences while also protecting nonrational beings from unjust treatment at a foundational level.
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative insists that to treat other persons merely as means is to act wrongly and irrationally. However, by restricting its parameters to only rational beings, Kant is inadvertently limiting the potential scope of an otherwise upstanding principle. But to cast this principle aside completely due to his oversights would be morally irresponsible. Why? Because when we treat others as ends in themselves, we are nurturing a feeling inside those individuals. We are reinforcing their intrinsic worth through our thoughtful use of words, our body language, and the sincerity of our energy, which, if authentically engaged, our interactions should, ideally, be a celebration of their dignity as well as our own. If our interactions abide by a just principle of humanity (which includes nonrational beings), all beings have the potential to flourish from human interaction and may avoid the unpleasant feeling of being used or depleted. If they remember anything about our interactions, it is the feeling they had when they were with us, the feeling that reinforced their intrinsic worth and the true essence of their nature. As a society, we simply cannot afford to give such a principle up without a fight.
Sincerely,
Heather
Works Consulted
“Episode 10: Kantian Ethics: What Should We do?” The Partially Examined Life. September 2024, Spotify.
Heiti, Warren. Lecture on Bernard William’s “A critique of utilitarianism.” Vancouver Island University, 9 October 2024.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Thomas Abbott, edited by Lara Denis. Broadview Editions, 2005.
Nusseibeh, Sari. “The Limit of Reason (or Why Dignity is Not Negotiable)”. Course pack for PHIL 443: Moral Theory, compiled by Dr. Warren Heiti, Fall 2024, Vancouver Island University.
Williams, Bernard. “A critique of utilitarianism.” Course pack for PHIL 443: Moral Theory, compiled by Dr. Warren Heiti, Fall 2024, Vancouver Island University.
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